Malicious code in @antv/xflow-diff (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/xflow-diff. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
- Ecosystems
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/xflow-diffMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/xflow-diff package was among those affected.
Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel and commits stolen credentials to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).
Stolen data includes AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. The attack also establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor.
The incident was detected by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, with attribution to the TeamPCP threat actor.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/xflow-diff
Remediation
- Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove or downgrade @antv/xflow-diff to a known-clean version prior to the compromise
- Audit npm account `atool` and all packages it maintains for additional malicious versions
- Review CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflow or similar persistence mechanisms
- Check for system daemons named `kitty-monitor` or similar persistence artifacts
- Monitor attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names for exfiltrated data
- Implement npm package integrity verification and preinstall hook auditing in your supply chain
- Consider using npm audit and third-party supply chain security tools to detect similar attacks
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-g23p-h876-r8q7 · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/xflow-diff (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-xflow-diff-npm-rqajik
Suggest a correction
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