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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/g6-mobile (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised, leading to publication of 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages including @antv/g6-mobile. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting users of @antv/g6-mobile and other compromised packages
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/g6-mobileMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and executed a coordinated supply chain attack known as "Mini Shai-Hulud," publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/g6-mobile package was among those compromised.\n\nEach malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. This script exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. The stolen data is transmitted via the GitHub API to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nBeyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered persistence strategy suggests intent for long-term access and continued data exfiltration.\n\nThe incident was identified by multiple security sources including Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, confirming the authenticity and scope of the compromise."

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/g6-mobile

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove @antv/g6-mobile and all other packages from the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign from production environments
  • Audit npm account `atool` and enable multi-factor authentication; rotate account credentials
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` or similar GitHub Actions workflows and remove them
  • Search systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove it
  • Review npm package.json lock files and dependency trees for any versions published during the 22-minute attack window
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to exfiltrated credentials and implement alerting on their use

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-2vpg-jvrh-ffcq · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/g6-mobile (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g6-mobile-npm-u4ag5q

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