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containedcritical

Malicious code in ai-figure (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including ai-figure, in an automated attack. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • ai-figurenpm package compromised with malicious preinstall hook

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst. The ai-figure package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.

Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor.

The incident was detected by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, indicating widespread detection and containment efforts across the ecosystem.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • ai-figure

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of ai-figure and the 313 other compromised packages from npm; do not install or update to any version published during the attack window
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows for the injected `Run Copilot` GitHub Actions workflow and remove it
  • Search systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove it
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Implement strict npm package verification and consider using npm audit to identify installed malicious versions
  • Enable 2FA on npm and GitHub accounts to prevent account takeover

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-g36c-rqq5-749v · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in ai-figure (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-ai-figure-npm-1hanlh

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