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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/g-webgl-compute (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-webgl-compute, as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; affects any user who installed affected versions during the attack window
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/g-webgl-computenpm package compromised with malicious preinstall hook

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched an automated attack that published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst. This incident is part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/g-webgl-compute package was among the affected packages modified to include malicious code.\n\nEach malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.\n\nBeyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was detected by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/g-webgl-compute

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove or downgrade @antv/g-webgl-compute to a version prior to the malicious publication; verify the package version in package-lock.json or yarn.lock
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows (especially GitHub Actions) for any suspicious workflows named 'Run Copilot' or other unexpected automation and remove them
  • Check for and remove any system daemons or processes named 'kitty-monitor' or similar persistence mechanisms
  • Review git commit history for any unexpected commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Scan systems for the obfuscated Bun script payload (498KB) and remove if found
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to exfiltrated credentials and implement additional access controls
  • Update npm account security: change password, enable 2FA, review authorized applications and tokens

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-mc79-gcgw-jg6h · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/g-webgl-compute (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-webgl-compute-npm-1cywvu

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