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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/stat (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/stat, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure/Kubernetes credentials, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe/Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/statMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

The npm account atool was compromised and weaponized to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor. The @antv/stat package was among those compromised.\n\nEach malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials—including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens—using the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nThe attack establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This represents a sophisticated, multi-vector supply chain compromise with broad impact across development and production environments.\n\nThe incident was detected by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, confirming the malicious nature of the compromised packages."

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/stat

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure service accounts, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe/Slack API keys) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of affected packages from npm; update to patched versions once available
  • Scan CI/CD systems for injected GitHub Actions workflows named 'Run Copilot' and remove them
  • Check for and remove system daemons named 'kitty-monitor' from affected systems
  • Review npm account security for the `atool` account and all related accounts; enable MFA and audit access logs
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed naming patterns
  • Implement package signature verification and supply chain security scanning in dependency management

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-73r9-92m6-g7j3 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/stat (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-stat-npm-qygeip

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