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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/semantic-release-pnpm (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/semantic-release-pnpm, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread impact on developers using affected packages
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/semantic-release-pnpmPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign affecting 314 packages

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and executed a coordinated supply chain attack campaign called "Mini Shai-Hulud." In a 22-minute automated burst, the attacker published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/semantic-release-pnpm.\n\nEach malicious version contains a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials via the GitHub API as a covert channel, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nBeyond credential theft, the malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered persistence approach suggests the attacker intended long-term access to compromised systems.\n\nThe attack was identified by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, confirming the presence of malicious code in the affected packages."

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/semantic-release-pnpm

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove or downgrade @antv/semantic-release-pnpm and all affected packages to versions prior to the malicious publication
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows for injected GitHub Actions workflows (e.g., 'Run Copilot') and remove any unauthorized workflows
  • Check for unauthorized system daemons (e.g., 'kitty-monitor') and remove them
  • Review npm account security and enable 2FA on npm accounts
  • Monitor for unauthorized commits to repositories with Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., 'harkonnen-melange-*')
  • Audit AI agent session hooks and remove any unauthorized configurations

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-fh82-9wq3-484r · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/semantic-release-pnpm (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-semantic-release-pnpm-npm-ff5krp

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