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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/scale (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/scale, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npm
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised package
Threat actor
Mini Shai HuludTeamPCP
Affected entities
  • @antv/scaleMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/scale package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel and steals a broad range of credentials: AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/scale

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of @antv/scale and other affected packages from npm; verify package integrity before reinstalling
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows and GitHub Actions for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious automation
  • Check systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove if present
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Implement package pinning and integrity verification (e.g., lock files, hash verification) to prevent installation of malicious versions
  • Monitor npm account activity and enable multi-factor authentication on all npm and GitHub accounts

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-x2mm-vh3m-65rv · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/scale (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-scale-npm-10g0su

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