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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/narrative-text-editor (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/narrative-text-editor, as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npm
Attack vectors
Compromised packageAccount takeover
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/narrative-text-editorMalicious preinstall hook injected

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched an automated attack publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst. This incident is part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign.

Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

The malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor.

The package @antv/narrative-text-editor was compromised as part of this campaign and modified to include the malicious preinstall hook. The incident was identified by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/narrative-text-editor

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove or downgrade @antv/narrative-text-editor to a version prior to the malicious publication
  • Audit CI/CD workflows for unauthorized GitHub Actions workflows named 'Run Copilot' or similar
  • Check for and remove system daemons named 'kitty-monitor' or similar persistence mechanisms
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Scan systems for the obfuscated Bun script payload (498KB in size)
  • Implement npm package verification and integrity checks
  • Monitor for unauthorized access using stolen credentials

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-rhpv-vmh9-r7h7 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/narrative-text-editor (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-narrative-text-editor-npm-ys29m7

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