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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/li-editor (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/li-editor, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Affected entities
  • @antv/li-editorMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

As part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, a threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a rapid 22-minute burst. The @antv/li-editor package was among those compromised, modified to include a malicious preinstall hook.

Each malicious version executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel, committing stolen data to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious payload establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered persistence strategy indicates a sophisticated, long-term compromise objective.

The incident was detected by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, confirming the malicious nature of the compromised packages.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/li-editor

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove or downgrade @antv/li-editor and all 314 affected packages to versions prior to the malicious publication
  • Audit CI/CD workflows for the injected 'Run Copilot' GitHub Actions workflow and remove it
  • Search systems for the 'kitty-monitor' daemon and remove it
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Implement npm package verification and integrity checks in your supply chain
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to compromised accounts and services
  • Rotate all authentication credentials across affected systems

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-jxqv-r6gx-2v7j · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/li-editor (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-li-editor-npm-1v8r4p

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