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Malicious code in @antv/gi-assets-graphscope (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account 'atool' and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst, including @antv/gi-assets-graphscope. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/gi-assets-graphscopeMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

As part of the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack campaign, a threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/gi-assets-graphscope package was among those affected.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered persistence strategy suggests intent for long-term access and continued data exfiltration.

The incident has been confirmed by multiple security sources including Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/gi-assets-graphscope

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of affected npm packages from your dependency tree and upgrade to known-clean versions
  • Audit all GitHub Actions workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious CI/CD modifications
  • Check for and remove any `kitty-monitor` system daemons or other persistence mechanisms
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Rotate all secrets and credentials used in CI/CD pipelines and development environments
  • Monitor npm account activity and enable multi-factor authentication on all npm accounts
  • Scan systems for the obfuscated Bun payload and any related artifacts

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-xxcr-3pm7-8rhh · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/gi-assets-graphscope (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-assets-graphscope-npm-stcxpl

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