Malicious code in @antv/gi-sdk (npm)
A threat actor compromised the npm account 'atool' and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/gi-sdk, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure/Kubernetes credentials, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe/Slack tokens) via the GitHub API. The attack also establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
- Ecosystems
- Attack vectors
- Affected entities
- @antv/gi-sdkMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of broader campaign affecting 314 packages
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and executed a coordinated supply chain attack known as "Mini Shai-Hulud," publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/gi-sdk package was among those compromised.\n\nEach malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. This script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nThe attack establishes multiple persistence mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection via a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets using toJSON(secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered approach ensures continued access and data exfiltration even after initial detection.\n\nThe incident was identified by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, with attribution to the TeamPCP threat actor. The attack represents a significant supply chain compromise affecting potentially thousands of downstream users and organizations.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/gi-sdk
Remediation
- Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure service accounts, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe/Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove @antv/gi-sdk and all affected packages from production environments
- Audit npm account 'atool' and all associated packages for malicious versions
- Review GitHub Actions workflows for unauthorized 'Run Copilot' or similar workflows and remove them
- Check for unauthorized system daemons named 'kitty-monitor' or similar persistence mechanisms
- Scan CI/CD logs for evidence of secret exfiltration
- Update npm to the latest version and use npm audit to identify compromised dependencies
- Monitor for unauthorized access to exfiltrated credentials across all services
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-grcj-f88x-xp63 · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/gi-sdk (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-sdk-npm-wn64po
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