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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/gi-cli (npm)

The npm account 'atool' was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/gi-cli, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npm
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised package
Threat actor
Mini Shai HuludTeamPCP
Affected entities
  • @antv/gi-cliPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; malicious preinstall hook injected

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/gi-cli package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor and identified by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Affected users should immediately revoke all exposed credentials and audit their systems for signs of compromise or persistence mechanisms.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/gi-cli

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, and other secrets that may have been exposed
  • Audit CI/CD workflows and GitHub Actions for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious automation
  • Check for and remove the `kitty-monitor` system daemon and any other persistence mechanisms
  • Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories (Dune-themed naming patterns) for exfiltrated data
  • Uninstall affected versions of @antv/gi-cli and all other compromised packages from the 314-package list
  • Update to patched versions once available and verify package integrity
  • Rotate all Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker credentials, and database connection strings
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to Stripe and Slack accounts
  • Review CloudTrail, GitHub audit logs, and other security logs for signs of credential misuse

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-pf8g-q4hp-r46f · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/gi-cli (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-cli-npm-1kita9

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