Malicious code in @antv/gi-assets-tugraph-analytics (npm)
The npm account 'atool' was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/gi-assets-tugraph-analytics, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflows and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
- Ecosystems
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/gi-assets-tugraph-analyticsMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and executed a coordinated supply chain attack campaign dubbed "Mini Shai-Hulud," publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst on or around July 27, 2026.
Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel and commits stolen credentials to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742). Targeted credentials include AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens.
The attack establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The specific package @antv/gi-assets-tugraph-analytics was modified to include the malicious preinstall hook executing the obfuscated payload.
The incident was identified by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, confirming the package compromise as part of the ongoing Mini Shai-Hulud campaign.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/gi-assets-tugraph-analytics
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove or downgrade @antv/gi-assets-tugraph-analytics and all other affected packages from the 314-package list to known-clean versions prior to the attack
- Scan CI/CD systems for the injected 'Run Copilot' GitHub Actions workflow and remove it
- Search for and remove the 'kitty-monitor' system daemon from affected systems
- Review git commit history and repository access logs for suspicious activity from attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
- Implement npm package signature verification and consider using npm audit to identify other compromised packages from the atool account
- Monitor for unauthorized access attempts using stolen credentials and rotate all secrets across all services
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-w792-8wjm-g8q7 · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/gi-assets-tugraph-analytics (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-assets-tugraph-analytics-npm-1vtgoo
Suggest a correction
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