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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure credentials, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, API keys) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; affects any developer who installed affected versions
Ecosystems
npm
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised package
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-rendererPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign affecting 314 packages total

The npm account atool was compromised as part of the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack campaign. The attacker published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst, including @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer.

Each malicious version contains a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Exfiltration occurs via the GitHub API to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious payload establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor.

The compromise was detected and reported by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure credentials, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, API keys) that may have been exposed on systems where affected versions were installed
  • Remove all malicious versions of @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer and the 313 other affected packages from your dependency tree
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflow or other suspicious workflow modifications
  • Check for and remove any system daemon named `kitty-monitor` or other persistence mechanisms
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Upgrade to patched versions once available from the maintainers
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to accounts and systems that may have been compromised

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-3272-5h83-x35h · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-zdog-svg-renderer-npm-1dkjv3

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