Malicious code in @antv/dipper-hooks (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/dipper-hooks, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting users of affected packages
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/dipper-hooksMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign
The npm account atool was compromised as part of the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack campaign. The threat actor published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst, including @antv/dipper-hooks.\n\nEach malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nThe attack establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The compromise was confirmed by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/dipper-hooks
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove all versions of @antv/dipper-hooks and other affected packages from npm; use npm audit to identify installed malicious versions
- Inspect CI/CD workflows and GitHub Actions for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious automation
- Check for unauthorized system daemons named `kitty-monitor` or similar persistence mechanisms
- Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names for exfiltrated data
- Rotate all secrets and credentials in affected environments
- Monitor for unauthorized access using stolen credentials across AWS, GCP, Azure, GitHub, npm, Docker, Kubernetes, and other services
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-w3wf-qx75-qchc · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/dipper-hooks (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-dipper-hooks-npm-1nt77p
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