Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-physx (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-physx, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting users of affected packages
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/g-plugin-physxnpm package compromised with malicious preinstall hook
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/g-plugin-physx package was among those compromised.
Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. This script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker authentication configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).
Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection via a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets using toJSON(secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor.
The compromise was identified by multiple security sources including Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/g-plugin-physx
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed on systems where affected packages were installed
- Remove all malicious versions of @antv/g-plugin-physx and other affected packages from npm; use only verified clean versions
- Inspect CI/CD workflows for the injected `Run Copilot` workflow and any unauthorized GitHub Actions workflows; remove malicious workflows
- Check for and remove the `kitty-monitor` system daemon from affected systems
- Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories (Dune-themed naming patterns) for exfiltrated data
- Implement package signature verification and use npm audit to detect compromised dependencies
- Monitor for suspicious preinstall hooks in package.json files across your codebase
- Rotate all credentials and implement principle of least privilege for CI/CD secrets
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-hr7p-82hq-pmmf · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-physx (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-physx-npm-lmwhml
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