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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-webgl-device (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-webgl-device, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/g-plugin-webgl-deviceMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

The "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign involved a threat actor compromising the npm account atool and publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/g-plugin-webgl-device package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. This script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was detected by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Affected users should immediately revoke all exposed credentials and remove affected package versions from their environments.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/g-plugin-webgl-device

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, and other secrets that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of @antv/g-plugin-webgl-device and other affected packages from production environments
  • Audit CI/CD workflows for the injected 'Run Copilot' GitHub Actions workflow and remove it
  • Check for and remove the 'kitty-monitor' system daemon from affected systems
  • Review npm account security and enable multi-factor authentication on npm accounts
  • Scan systems for the obfuscated Bun script payload and any persistence mechanisms
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to exfiltrated credentials and services

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-rjh6-2fw9-c9cw · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-webgl-device (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-webgl-device-npm-1ibj6k

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