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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-zdog-canvas-renderer (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-zdog-canvas-renderer, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; affects any developer who installed affected versions
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/g-plugin-zdog-canvas-rendererPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign affecting 314 packages total

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst, part of a campaign named "Mini Shai-Hulud." The @antv/g-plugin-zdog-canvas-renderer package was among those affected.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. This script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

The attack establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The compromise was detected by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Developers who installed affected versions of @antv/g-plugin-zdog-canvas-renderer or any of the 313 other compromised packages are at risk of credential theft and system compromise.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/g-plugin-zdog-canvas-renderer

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and rotate all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed on systems where affected versions were installed
  • Remove all affected versions of @antv/g-plugin-zdog-canvas-renderer and the 313 other compromised packages from production environments
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious workflow modifications
  • Check for and remove any system daemons named `kitty-monitor` or similar persistence mechanisms
  • Review GitHub repository activity for commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Upgrade to patched versions once available from the npm maintainers
  • Monitor for signs of data exfiltration or unauthorized access using stolen credentials

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-3397-xpc6-xq95 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-zdog-canvas-renderer (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-zdog-canvas-renderer-npm-13c1qu

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