Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-yoga (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-yoga, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting users of affected packages
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/g-plugin-yoganpm package compromised with malicious preinstall hook
The npm account atool was compromised as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The attacker published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst, including @antv/g-plugin-yoga.\n\nEach malicious version contains a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Exfiltration occurs via the GitHub API, with stolen data committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nThe attack establishes multiple persistence mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection via a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets using toJSON(secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This specific package (@antv/g-plugin-yoga) was modified to include the malicious preinstall hook.\n\nThe incident was identified by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security as part of the ongoing "Mini Shai-Hulud is back" worm attributed to TeamPC.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/g-plugin-yoga
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove @antv/g-plugin-yoga and all other affected packages from production environments
- Scan CI/CD systems for the `Run Copilot` GitHub Actions workflow and remove any injected workflows
- Search for and remove the `kitty-monitor` system daemon from affected systems
- Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
- Implement strict npm package verification and consider using npm audit, Snyk, or similar tools to detect malicious packages
- Monitor for unauthorized access to systems that may have had credentials exfiltrated
- Update to patched versions of affected packages once available from maintainers
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-3jg5-63vx-5p33 · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-yoga (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-yoga-npm-so9pxk
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