Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-webgl-renderer (npm)
A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-webgl-renderer, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread impact on npm ecosystem
- Ecosystems
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/g-plugin-webgl-rendererPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign affecting 314 packages
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and executed a coordinated supply chain attack campaign dubbed "Mini Shai-Hulud," publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/g-plugin-webgl-renderer package was among those compromised.\n\nEach malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker authentication configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Exfiltration occurs via the GitHub API, with stolen data committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nThe attack establishes multiple persistence mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection via a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets using toJSON(secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered approach ensures continued access and data exfiltration even after the initial malicious package versions are removed.\n\nThe incident was detected by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, confirming the presence of malicious code in the affected packages."
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/g-plugin-webgl-renderer
Remediation
- Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove or downgrade @antv/g-plugin-webgl-renderer and all affected packages to versions prior to the malicious release
- Audit npm account `atool` and any packages it maintains for additional compromise
- Review GitHub Actions workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflow or similar persistence mechanisms
- Scan systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove if present
- Monitor for unauthorized access to exfiltrated credentials and services
- Enable npm 2FA and audit package publishing logs for suspicious activity
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-m4px-jrch-5rv4 · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-webgl-renderer (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-webgl-renderer-npm-atcjdw
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