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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-svg-picker (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-svg-picker, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/g-plugin-svg-pickerMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

A large-scale supply chain attack dubbed "Mini Shai-Hulud" compromised the npm account atool, resulting in the publication of 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/g-plugin-svg-picker package was among those affected.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was confirmed by multiple security sources including Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/g-plugin-svg-picker

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of @antv/g-plugin-svg-picker and any other affected packages from npm; use npm audit to identify installed malicious versions
  • Review and remove any suspicious GitHub Actions workflows named 'Run Copilot' or similar from repositories
  • Inspect systems for the 'kitty-monitor' daemon and remove if present
  • Audit CI/CD pipelines and GitHub Actions for unauthorized workflow modifications
  • Monitor attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names for exfiltrated data
  • Update to patched versions of affected packages once available
  • Implement stricter npm account security controls and enable 2FA on all npm accounts

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-9wwp-32v6-mhm5 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-svg-picker (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-svg-picker-npm-1lxc82

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