Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-mobile-interaction (npm)
A threat actor compromised the npm account 'atool' and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-mobile-interaction, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; affects all users who installed affected versions
- Ecosystems
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/g-plugin-mobile-interactionMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign
As part of the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack campaign, a threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst on or around July 26, 2026. The @antv/g-plugin-mobile-interaction package was among those compromised.
Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).
Beyond credential theft, the malicious payload establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was confirmed by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/g-plugin-mobile-interaction
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed on systems that installed affected versions
- Remove or downgrade @antv/g-plugin-mobile-interaction to a known-clean version prior to the malicious publication
- Inspect CI/CD workflows and GitHub Actions for unauthorized workflows named 'Run Copilot' or similar and remove them
- Check for and remove any system daemons named 'kitty-monitor' or similar persistence mechanisms
- Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names for exfiltrated data
- Implement npm package integrity verification and consider using npm audit to identify other compromised packages from the 314 affected
- Monitor for suspicious outbound connections to attacker infrastructure and review logs for evidence of the obfuscated Bun script execution
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-f3mw-2vrc-c62j · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-mobile-interaction (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-mobile-interaction-npm-18oax4
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