Skip to content
supplychainattack.orgSupply chain attack incident catalog
containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-dom-interaction (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-dom-interaction, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

ShareXLinkedInHacker News
Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npm
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised package
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/g-plugin-dom-interactionMalicious preinstall hook injected

As part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, a threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a rapid 22-minute burst. The @antv/g-plugin-dom-interaction package was among those affected.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. This script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious payload establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was detected by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/g-plugin-dom-interaction

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and rotate all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of @antv/g-plugin-dom-interaction and other affected packages from npm; use npm audit to identify installed malicious versions
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious workflow modifications
  • Check for and remove any system daemons named `kitty-monitor` or similar persistence mechanisms
  • Review git commit history in repositories for suspicious commits with Dune-themed naming patterns
  • Implement strict npm package pinning and use lock files to prevent automatic installation of malicious versions
  • Enable 2FA on npm and GitHub accounts to prevent account takeover

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-r6w9-92g7-mj3g · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-dom-interaction (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-dom-interaction-npm-afkg5x

Suggest a correction

Found an error or have a newer source? Corrections to factual errors take priority over new entries.

Related incidents

  1. containedcritical

    Malicious code in @antv/f-wx (npm)

    The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/f-wx. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

    Mini Shai HuludTeamPCPnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
  2. containedcritical

    Malicious code in @antv/g-web-components (npm)

    A threat actor compromised the npm account 'atool' and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst, including @antv/g-web-components. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

    Mini Shai HuludnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
  3. containedcritical

    Malicious code in @antv/dipper-hooks (npm)

    The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/dipper-hooks, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

    Mini Shai HuludnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
  4. containedcritical

    Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-webgl-device (npm)

    A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-webgl-device, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

    Mini Shai HuludnpmAccount takeoverCompromised package