Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-box2d (npm)
A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-box2d, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/g-plugin-box2dMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign
As part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, a threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a rapid 22-minute burst. The @antv/g-plugin-box2d package was among those affected, modified to include a malicious preinstall hook.
Each malicious version executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script upon installation, using the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel. The script steals a broad range of credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).
Beyond credential theft, the malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered persistence strategy indicates a sophisticated, long-term compromise objective.
The incident was identified by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, confirming the malicious nature of the compromised packages.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/g-plugin-box2d
Remediation
- Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed on systems that installed affected versions
- Audit CI/CD workflows and GitHub Actions for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious workflow modifications
- Search for and remove the `kitty-monitor` system daemon from affected systems
- Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories (Dune-themed naming patterns) for exfiltrated data
- Update @antv/g-plugin-box2d and all 314 affected packages to patched versions once available
- Implement npm package integrity verification and monitor for suspicious preinstall hooks in future installations
- Enable GitHub secret scanning and audit logs to detect unauthorized access or exfiltration attempts
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-gjxq-cxhw-vfxp · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-box2d (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-plugin-box2d-npm-1okuie
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