Malicious code in @antv/g-perf (npm)
The npm account 'atool' was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/g-perf. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/g-perfPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; malicious preinstall hook injected
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched an automated attack publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/g-perf package was among those compromised.
Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.
Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The compromise was confirmed by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.
The attack represents a large-scale automated supply chain compromise targeting the npm ecosystem with broad credential harvesting and persistence capabilities.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/g-perf
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed on systems where malicious versions were installed
- Remove all malicious versions of affected packages from npm; verify package integrity before reinstalling
- Inspect CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` or similar workflows and remove them
- Check for and remove the `kitty-monitor` system daemon from affected systems
- Review GitHub repositories for commits with Dune-themed names (e.g., `harkonnen-melange-*`) and investigate for exfiltrated data
- Implement strict npm package verification and consider using npm audit to identify installed malicious versions
- Enable MFA on npm accounts and review account access logs for the `atool` account and related accounts
- Monitor for suspicious CI/CD activity and AI agent session hooks in affected environments
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-qfx4-mrhx-34p5 · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/g-perf (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-perf-npm-1n7x85
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