Malicious code in @antv/g-layout-blocklike (npm)
The npm account 'atool' was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated attack known as "Mini Shai-Hulud." The @antv/g-layout-blocklike package was among those modified to inject a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; affects any developer who installed affected versions
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/g-layout-blocklikenpm package compromised with malicious preinstall hook
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a coordinated 22-minute burst as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/g-layout-blocklike package was among the affected packages modified to include a malicious preinstall hook.
Each malicious version injects a 498KB obfuscated Bun script that uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel. The script steals a broad range of credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.
Beyond credential theft, the malicious payload establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered persistence approach indicates intent for long-term access and continued data exfiltration.
The incident was identified by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, confirming the presence of malicious code in the package.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/g-layout-blocklike
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove or downgrade @antv/g-layout-blocklike to a version prior to the malicious publication; verify the package version in package-lock.json or yarn.lock
- Scan CI/CD systems for the injected GitHub Actions workflow named 'Run Copilot' and remove any unauthorized workflows
- Search for and remove any system daemon named 'kitty-monitor' from affected systems
- Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names (e.g., harkonnen-melange-*)
- Implement npm package verification and integrity checks; consider using npm audit and supply chain security tools
- Monitor for unauthorized access or activity using the stolen credentials across all affected services
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-j7jx-fcx4-53p7 · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/g-layout-blocklike (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g-layout-blocklike-npm-1eebfp
Suggest a correction
Found an error or have a newer source? Corrections to factual errors take priority over new entries.
Related incidents
- containedcritical
Malicious code in @antv/f-wx (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/f-wx. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
Mini Shai HuludTeamPCPnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit - containedcritical
Malicious code in @antv/g-web-components (npm)
A threat actor compromised the npm account 'atool' and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst, including @antv/g-web-components. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
Mini Shai HuludnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit - containedcritical
Malicious code in @antv/dipper-hooks (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/dipper-hooks, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
Mini Shai HuludnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit - containedcritical
Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-physx (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-physx, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
Mini Shai HuludnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit