Malicious code in @antv/f2-site (npm)
A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/f2-site, as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
- Ecosystems
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/f2-siteMalicious preinstall hook injected
The npm account atool was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst. This incident is attributed to the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, with attribution to the TeamPCP threat actor.
Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel and steals a broad range of credentials: AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).
Beyond credential theft, the malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor.
The specific package @antv/f2-site was modified to include the malicious preinstall hook executing the obfuscated Bun payload. The incident was identified by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/f2-site
Remediation
- Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove all versions of @antv/f2-site and other affected packages from npm; audit npm account security and enable 2FA
- Audit CI/CD workflows for unauthorized GitHub Actions workflows named 'Run Copilot' or similar; review workflow logs for secret exfiltration
- Search systems for the 'kitty-monitor' daemon and remove it; audit system processes and startup configurations
- Review git repositories for commits from the attacker-controlled accounts with Dune-themed names (e.g., harkonnen-melange-*)
- Scan all systems that installed affected packages for the obfuscated Bun script and remove it
- Monitor for unauthorized access to exfiltrated credentials and services
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-vj9m-5hgc-w93w · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/f2-site (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-f2-site-npm-rx88o6
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