Malicious code in @antv/f2-my (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/f2-my, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/f2-myMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/f2-my package was among those compromised.
Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).
Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor and detected by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/f2-my
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove all malicious versions of affected packages from npm; verify package integrity before installation
- Scan CI/CD systems for injected GitHub Actions workflows named 'Run Copilot' or similar and remove them
- Check for and remove the 'kitty-monitor' system daemon from affected systems
- Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names for exfiltrated data
- Implement strict npm package verification and consider using npm audit to detect compromised dependencies
- Enable multi-factor authentication on npm and GitHub accounts to prevent account takeover
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-jcpg-w7fw-jv6j · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/f2-my (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-f2-my-npm-1eu3f9
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