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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/f2-canvas (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/f2-canvas, each injecting a preinstall hook that executes an obfuscated Bun script to exfiltrate credentials and establish persistence. The attack was part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages published in a 22-minute automated burst; affects all users who installed affected versions during the attack window.
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/f2-canvasMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and executed an automated attack publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst. The @antv/f2-canvas package was among those affected, modified to include a malicious preinstall hook.\n\nEach malicious version executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel, committing stolen data to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nThe attack establishes multiple persistence mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection via a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets, AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This incident is part of the ongoing "Mini Shai-Hulud" worm campaign attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor.\n\nThe compromise was detected by multiple security sources including Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/f2-canvas

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed on systems that installed affected versions
  • Remove or downgrade @antv/f2-canvas to a version prior to the malicious publication; verify the package version against the official npm registry history
  • Scan CI/CD systems for the injected GitHub Actions workflow named 'Run Copilot' and remove any unauthorized workflows
  • Search for and remove the system daemon 'kitty-monitor' from affected systems
  • Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names for exfiltrated data
  • Implement npm package integrity verification and consider using npm audit to identify other affected packages from the 314 compromised packages
  • Monitor for signs of persistence mechanisms and unauthorized access using the exfiltrated credentials

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-h6vv-v545-wpvp · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/f2-canvas (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-f2-canvas-npm-1ihzku

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