Malicious code in @antv/f-my (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst, including @antv/f-my. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread impact on npm ecosystem and CI/CD pipelines
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/f-myCompromised as part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; malicious preinstall hook injected
A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst. The @antv/f-my package was among those compromised.
Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel and steals a broad range of credentials: AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).
Beyond credential theft, the malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The campaign was attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor and detected by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/f-my
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
- Remove all malicious versions of affected packages from npm; do not install or update to any version published during the 22-minute attack window
- Inspect CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflow or other suspicious GitHub Actions; remove any injected workflows
- Search systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove it; audit system processes and startup configurations for persistence mechanisms
- Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories (Dune-themed naming patterns) for exfiltrated data
- Implement package signature verification and use npm audit to detect compromised dependencies
- Enable GitHub secret scanning and audit logs to detect unauthorized access or workflow modifications
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-68qq-h9p8-pf77 · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/f-my (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-f-my-npm-rr702u
Suggest a correction
Found an error or have a newer source? Corrections to factual errors take priority over new entries.
Related incidents
- containedcritical
Malicious code in @antv/f-wx (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/f-wx. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
Mini Shai HuludTeamPCPnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit - containedcritical
Malicious code in @antv/g-web-components (npm)
A threat actor compromised the npm account 'atool' and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst, including @antv/g-web-components. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
Mini Shai HuludnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit - containedcritical
Malicious code in @antv/dipper-hooks (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/dipper-hooks, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
Mini Shai HuludnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit - containedcritical
Malicious code in @antv/g-plugin-physx (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g-plugin-physx, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
Mini Shai HuludnpmOtherAccount takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit