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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/data-samples (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/data-samples. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/data-samplesCompromised as part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; malicious preinstall hook injected

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched an automated attack publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/data-samples package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Exfiltration occurs via the GitHub API to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.

Beyond credential theft, the attack establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was detected by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

The compromise represents a large-scale, automated supply chain attack with sophisticated persistence and exfiltration capabilities targeting development environments and CI/CD systems.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/data-samples

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Audit and remove any GitHub Actions workflows named 'Run Copilot' or similar suspicious workflows from affected repositories
  • Remove or uninstall all versions of @antv/data-samples and other affected packages from npm; use npm audit to identify compromised dependencies
  • Check for and remove any system daemons named 'kitty-monitor' or similar persistence mechanisms from affected systems
  • Review CI/CD logs and Git history for unauthorized changes or commits from the compromised period
  • Rotate all authentication credentials used in CI/CD pipelines and development environments
  • Monitor for suspicious outbound connections to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-h4ph-jfgx-fm3m · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/data-samples (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-data-samples-npm-zgercv

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