Malicious code in @antv/chart-linter (npm)
The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/chart-linter, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure credentials, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, API keys) via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting users of affected packages
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antv/chart-linterMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign
The npm account atool was compromised and weaponized to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/chart-linter package was among those affected, with malicious code injected into its preinstall hook.\n\nEach malicious version executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script during installation that exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP and Azure service accounts, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker authentication configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. The stolen data is sent to attacker-controlled repositories via the GitHub API, following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nBeyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes multiple persistence mechanisms: injection of a GitHub Actions workflow named "Run Copilot" that dumps all repository secrets via toJSON(secrets), AI agent session hooks, and installation of a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered approach ensures continued access and data exfiltration even after the initial compromise is detected.\n\nThe incident was identified by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security scanning systems, confirming the presence of malicious code in the affected package."
Indicators of compromise
- Packages
- @antv/chart-linter
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure service accounts, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, API keys) that may have been exposed on systems where affected packages were installed
- Remove all malicious versions of affected packages from npm; update to patched versions once available
- Scan CI/CD workflows for injected GitHub Actions workflows (e.g., 'Run Copilot') and remove any unauthorized workflows
- Check for and remove system daemons named 'kitty-monitor' or similar persistence mechanisms
- Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names (e.g., 'harkonnen-melange-*') for exfiltrated data
- Implement package pinning and integrity verification (e.g., npm audit, lock files) to prevent installation of malicious versions
- Monitor for suspicious preinstall/postinstall hooks in package.json files across your dependency tree
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-pmg7-4qcw-g3xg · GitHub Advisory Database
Cite this entry
"Malicious code in @antv/chart-linter (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 26, 2026; last updated July 26, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-chart-linter-npm-hpbwny
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