The Worm That Keeps on Digging: TeamPCP Hits @antv in Latest Wave
TeamPCP conducted a multi-ecosystem supply chain compromise targeting the @antv package and associated development infrastructure. The attack leveraged GitHub, NPM, and VSCode to steal credentials and establish persistence mechanisms.
- Disclosed
- Last updated
- Blast radius
- Multi-ecosystem; affects GitHub, NPM, and VSCode users; credential theft and persistence mechanisms enable lateral movement.
- Attack vectors
- Threat actor
- Affected entities
- @antvTargeted by TeamPCP in supply chain compromise
TeamPCP has been identified as the actor behind a multi-ecosystem supply chain compromise targeting @antv. The attack exploited multiple platforms including GitHub, NPM, and VSCode to establish a foothold in developer environments.
The threat actor employed credential theft and persistence techniques to enable ongoing access and lateral movement. The compromise affects both the package distribution channel (NPM) and developer tooling (VSCode), indicating a sophisticated approach to supply chain infiltration.
This represents an active threat leveraging account compromise or package manipulation to distribute malicious code across multiple connected ecosystems. Organizations using @antv should audit their environments for unauthorized access and review package integrity.
Remediation
- Immediately audit and revoke any credentials exposed through GitHub or VSCode integrations
- Review @antv package versions and their installation sources; verify package integrity and provenance
- Scan development environments for persistence mechanisms or suspicious artifacts
- Monitor GitHub and NPM accounts for unauthorized activity or commits
- Implement Code Signing verification for package installations
- Isolate affected systems and conduct forensic analysis to identify lateral movement
- Apply principle of least privilege to GitHub tokens and NPM credentials
Sources
Cite this entry
"The Worm That Keeps on Digging: TeamPCP Hits @antv in Latest Wave." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed May 19, 2026; last updated June 7, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/the-worm-that-keeps-on-digging-teampcp-hits-antv-in-latest-wave-1lm5r0
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