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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/gi-sdk-app (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/gi-sdk-app. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/gi-sdk-appPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; malicious preinstall hook injected

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched an automated attack publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/gi-sdk-app package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Exfiltration occurs via the GitHub API to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.

Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was confirmed by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/gi-sdk-app

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and rotate all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens)
  • Remove all versions of @antv/gi-sdk-app and other affected packages from npm; do not install or update to any version published during the attack window
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` or similar workflows; remove any injected workflows
  • Search systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove it
  • Review GitHub API logs and repository access for suspicious activity from attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Regenerate all secrets used in CI/CD pipelines and environment variables
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, Docker registries, and other services using stolen credentials

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-c3q3-8jgv-87v5 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/gi-sdk-app (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-sdk-app-npm-0te60m

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