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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/webgpu-graph (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/webgpu-graph, as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/webgpu-graphPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign; malicious preinstall hook injected

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/webgpu-graph package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

The attack establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The compromise was confirmed by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/webgpu-graph

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove or audit all GitHub Actions workflows, particularly any named 'Run Copilot' or similar, for unauthorized secret exfiltration
  • Uninstall all versions of @antv/webgpu-graph and any other packages from the `atool` account; use npm audit to identify affected dependencies
  • Scan systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove any unauthorized persistence mechanisms
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Implement npm package pinning and integrity verification; consider using private registries or package allowlists
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to CI/CD systems, cloud accounts, and repositories using stolen credentials

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-vgxx-qpq8-rfr7 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/webgpu-graph (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-webgpu-graph-npm-1b9ecg

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