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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/l7-three (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/l7-three, each injecting a preinstall hook that executes an obfuscated Bun script to exfiltrate credentials and establish persistence. The attack targeted AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Affected entities
  • @antv/l7-threeModified with malicious preinstall hook as part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and executed an automated supply chain attack dubbed "Mini Shai-Hulud," publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst. The @antv/l7-three package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials—including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens—using the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious payload establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor and identified by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Affected users should immediately audit their systems for the presence of the kitty-monitor daemon, review CI/CD workflows for unauthorized Run Copilot actions, rotate all credentials that may have been exposed, and update to patched versions of affected packages.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/l7-three

Remediation

  • Immediately remove or downgrade @antv/l7-three to a version prior to the malicious release
  • Audit all npm packages installed from the compromised `atool` account for malicious preinstall hooks
  • Rotate all credentials that may have been exposed: AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens
  • Search systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove if found
  • Review GitHub Actions workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflow and delete if present
  • Monitor attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names (e.g., `harkonnen-melange-*`) for exfiltrated data
  • Enable MFA on npm account and review account activity logs
  • Implement package pinning and integrity verification in dependency management

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-gjrp-hvwh-82xh · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/l7-three (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-l7-three-npm-cdtfeb

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