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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/l7-extension-g-layer (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account 'atool' and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/l7-extension-g-layerPart of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign affecting 314 packages total

The npm account atool was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a rapid, automated 22-minute burst. This incident is part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign.

Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

The malicious payload establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor.

The package @antv/l7-extension-g-layer was among the 314 compromised packages, modified to include the malicious preinstall hook executing the obfuscated Bun payload.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/l7-extension-g-layer

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke and rotate all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of affected packages from npm; audit package.json and lock files for any installations of @antv/l7-extension-g-layer and other packages from the 314 affected packages
  • Audit CI/CD workflows and GitHub Actions for unauthorized workflows named 'Run Copilot' or similar; review workflow logs for secret exfiltration
  • Scan systems for the 'kitty-monitor' daemon and remove any unauthorized persistence mechanisms
  • Review npm account security for the 'atool' account and all related accounts; enable MFA and audit access logs
  • Monitor for unauthorized commits to repositories with Dune-themed names (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742) that may contain exfiltrated credentials

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-jmqp-4384-6rv6 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/l7-extension-g-layer (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-l7-extension-g-layer-npm-1t5tgm

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