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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/hierarchy (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/hierarchy, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread exposure to any project installing affected versions
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/hierarchynpm package compromised with malicious preinstall hook

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The attack occurred in an automated 22-minute burst, with @antv/hierarchy among the affected packages.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The compromise was confirmed by multiple security sources including Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Remediation requires immediate removal of affected package versions, credential rotation for all potentially exposed secrets, and inspection of CI/CD workflows and system processes for injected malicious code.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/hierarchy

Remediation

  • Immediately remove or downgrade @antv/hierarchy to a version prior to the malicious release
  • Rotate all credentials that may have been exposed: AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens
  • Audit all CI/CD workflows for the injected 'Run Copilot' GitHub Actions workflow and remove it
  • Scan systems for the 'kitty-monitor' daemon and remove it
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Audit npm account security and enable 2FA on all npm accounts
  • Monitor for any unauthorized access or data exfiltration in logs

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-vcpf-f8qv-hqf6 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/hierarchy (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-hierarchy-npm-12wsbm

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