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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/github-config-cli (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated attack. The @antv/github-config-cli package was modified to include a malicious preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/github-config-cli · multiple malicious versions

A large-scale supply chain attack, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" campaign, compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst. The @antv/github-config-cli package was among those affected.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.

Beyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was detected by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

The incident represents a significant threat to organizations using affected packages, with potential for widespread credential compromise and persistent access to development and production environments.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/github-config-cli

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all versions of @antv/github-config-cli and other affected packages from production environments
  • Audit CI/CD workflows for the presence of suspicious workflows named 'Run Copilot' or other unauthorized actions
  • Search systems for the 'kitty-monitor' daemon and remove if found
  • Review git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Implement strict npm package pinning and verification practices
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to development and production systems using stolen credentials
  • Update npm account security (strong passwords, 2FA) and review account activity logs

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-m34q-fh55-gxcc · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/github-config-cli (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-github-config-cli-npm-8zo9vd

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