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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/gi-theme-antd (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/gi-theme-antd, each injecting a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script. The attack exfiltrated credentials via GitHub API and established persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/gi-theme-antdMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched an automated supply chain attack known as "Mini Shai-Hulud," publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst. The @antv/gi-theme-antd package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version includes a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen data is committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.

Beyond credential theft, the malicious versions establish persistence mechanisms including CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was identified by multiple security sources including Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/gi-theme-antd

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of @antv/gi-theme-antd and other affected packages from npm; do not install or update to any version published during the attack window
  • Inspect CI/CD workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious GitHub Actions; remove any injected workflows
  • Check for and remove the `kitty-monitor` system daemon and any other persistence mechanisms from affected systems
  • Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories (Dune-themed naming patterns) for exfiltrated secrets
  • Rotate all credentials and implement monitoring for unauthorized access patterns
  • Update npm account security: enable 2FA, review authorized applications, and audit access logs for the `atool` account

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-7ppw-hc3r-gj53 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/gi-theme-antd (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-theme-antd-npm-1fyk0j

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