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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/gi-public-data (npm)

The npm account 'atool' was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. @antv/gi-public-data was among the affected packages, modified to include a malicious preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/gi-public-data
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/gi-public-datanpm package compromised with malicious preinstall hook

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/gi-public-data package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

The attack establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection via a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The compromise was detected by multiple security sources including Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/gi-public-data

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all versions of @antv/gi-public-data and other affected packages from production environments
  • Review npm account security and enable multi-factor authentication on all npm accounts
  • Audit GitHub Actions workflows for suspicious `Run Copilot` workflow or other unauthorized workflows and remove them
  • Check for and remove any `kitty-monitor` system daemons or other persistence mechanisms
  • Scan CI/CD logs and environment variables for evidence of credential exfiltration
  • Monitor attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names for stolen data
  • Update to patched versions of affected packages once available from maintainers

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-m96f-gv5h-rfxh · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/gi-public-data (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-public-data-npm-1xjt8p

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