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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/gi-assets-xlab (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/gi-assets-xlab, in a 22-minute automated burst. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential exfiltration affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/gi-assets-xlabMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

The npm account atool was compromised as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The threat actor published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in an automated 22-minute burst, including @antv/gi-assets-xlab.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The compromise was confirmed by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/gi-assets-xlab

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of @antv/gi-assets-xlab and other affected packages from npm; audit package.json lock files for any installations
  • Audit CI/CD workflows and GitHub Actions for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflows or other suspicious workflow modifications
  • Search systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove it; audit system startup configurations
  • Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names for exfiltrated data
  • Implement package signature verification and use npm audit to detect compromised dependencies
  • Monitor for unauthorized access patterns in cloud accounts and CI/CD systems

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-36gc-9c89-8g8v · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/gi-assets-xlab (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-assets-xlab-npm-1d9uvx

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