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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/gi-assets-scene (npm)

The npm account 'atool' was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 packages, including @antv/gi-assets-scene. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials via the GitHub API and establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Threat actor
Mini Shai Hulud
Affected entities
  • @antv/gi-assets-sceneMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of Mini Shai-Hulud campaign

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched an automated attack publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute burst, part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign. The @antv/gi-assets-scene package was among those compromised.

Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns.

Beyond credential theft, the malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was detected by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security.

The incident represents a large-scale, automated supply chain compromise with sophisticated persistence and exfiltration capabilities targeting development environments and CI/CD infrastructure.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/gi-assets-scene

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of affected packages from npm; audit package.json and lock files for any versions published during the attack window
  • Inspect GitHub Actions workflows for unauthorized `Run Copilot` workflow or other suspicious CI/CD modifications; remove malicious workflows
  • Check for and remove the `kitty-monitor` system daemon and any other unauthorized persistence mechanisms
  • Audit git commit history for suspicious commits to attacker-controlled repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Rotate all secrets in CI/CD environments and re-authenticate to all services
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, Docker registries, databases, Stripe, and Slack accounts
  • Update to patched versions of affected packages once available

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-mgfj-f4wf-c5vm · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/gi-assets-scene (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-gi-assets-scene-npm-1psbnh

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