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containedcritical

Malicious code in @antv/g6-cli (npm)

A threat actor compromised the npm account `atool` and published 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including @antv/g6-cli, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure/Kubernetes credentials, SSH keys, Docker configs, database strings, Stripe/Slack tokens) via the GitHub API. The attack also establishes persistence through CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Threat actor
Affected entities
  • @antv/g6-cliMalicious preinstall hook injected; part of broader campaign affecting 314 packages

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and executed a coordinated supply chain attack dubbed "Mini Shai-Hulud," publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a 22-minute automated burst. The @antv/g6-cli package was among those compromised.\n\nEach malicious version injects a preinstall hook that executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script. This script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel to steal sensitive credentials, including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker authentication configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. Stolen credentials are committed to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).\n\nBeyond credential theft, the malicious code establishes multiple persistence mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection (a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets via toJSON(secrets)), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. This multi-layered approach ensures the attacker maintains long-term access even after the initial compromise is detected.\n\nThe incident was identified by Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security, with attribution to the TeamPCP threat actor. Organizations using @antv/g6-cli or any of the 314 affected packages should immediately revoke all exposed credentials and remove malicious versions."

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @antv/g6-cli

Remediation

  • Immediately audit and revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP/Azure service accounts, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth, database credentials, Stripe/Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Remove all malicious versions of @antv/g6-cli and any other affected packages from your environment
  • Scan CI/CD workflows for injected GitHub Actions workflows (e.g., 'Run Copilot') and remove them
  • Check for and remove any system daemons named 'kitty-monitor' or similar persistence mechanisms
  • Review npm account security and enable 2FA on all npm accounts
  • Monitor for unauthorized access to exfiltrated credentials and services
  • Update to patched versions of affected packages once available from maintainers

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-jx6x-93cv-8j2f · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @antv/g6-cli (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 27, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-antv-g6-cli-npm-iyei7k

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