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containedcritical

Malicious code in amapcn (npm)

The npm account `atool` was compromised and used to publish 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages, including amapcn, in an automated 22-minute burst. Each malicious version injects a preinstall hook executing an obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates credentials and establishes persistence via CI/CD workflow injection and system daemons.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages; widespread credential theft affecting AWS, GitHub, npm, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SSH, Docker, databases, Stripe, and Slack
Ecosystems
npmOther
Attack vectors
Account takeoverCompromised packageMalicious commit
Affected entities
  • amapcnnpm package compromised with malicious preinstall hook

A threat actor compromised the npm account atool and launched the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain attack campaign, publishing 631 malicious versions across 314 npm packages in a rapid 22-minute burst. The amapcn package was among those modified to include a malicious preinstall hook.

Each malicious version executes a 498KB obfuscated Bun script that exfiltrates sensitive credentials including AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes service account tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database connection strings, Stripe keys, and Slack tokens. The script uses the GitHub API as a covert exfiltration channel, committing stolen data to attacker-controlled repositories following Dune-themed naming patterns (e.g., harkonnen-melange-742).

Beyond credential theft, the malicious packages establish persistence through multiple mechanisms: CI/CD workflow injection via a GitHub Actions workflow named Run Copilot that dumps all secrets using toJSON(secrets), AI agent session hooks, and a system daemon named kitty-monitor. The attack was attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor and detected by both Amazon Inspector and Google Open Source Security sources.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • amapcn

Remediation

  • Immediately revoke all credentials (AWS keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, GCP service accounts, Azure credentials, Kubernetes tokens, SSH keys, Docker auth configs, database credentials, Stripe keys, Slack tokens) that may have been exposed
  • Audit npm account `atool` and all associated packages for unauthorized access and malicious versions
  • Remove all malicious versions of affected packages from npm; update to patched versions if available
  • Scan CI/CD systems for the `Run Copilot` GitHub Actions workflow and remove any unauthorized workflows
  • Search systems for the `kitty-monitor` daemon and remove it
  • Review git commit history in attacker-controlled repositories (Dune-themed naming patterns) for exfiltrated data
  • Implement package signature verification and integrity checks for npm dependencies
  • Enable 2FA and IP allowlisting on npm accounts and GitHub accounts with publishing rights
  • Monitor for suspicious preinstall/postinstall hooks in package.json files across the supply chain

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-8xch-qgqv-h8fh · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in amapcn (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 27, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-amapcn-npm-18hc4a

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