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supplychainattack.orgSupply chain attack incident catalog
resolvedhigh

Malicious code in zip-me (PyPI)

The PyPI package zip-me contained malicious code designed to exfiltrate system information including IP address and username. The malware was activated during package installation via a metaclass override in setup.py and employed VM-detection techniques to avoid analysis.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
Limited to systems that installed the malicious package during the campaign period
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Affected entities
  • zip-mePyPI package containing malicious code

The zip-me package on PyPI was identified as containing malicious code as part of the 2024-12-langer-updater campaign. During installation, the package collects extensive host information with no legitimate purpose, including IP address and username data.\n\nThe malicious payload was obfuscated within a ZIP archive embedded in the package and included VM-detection techniques to evade sandbox analysis. The code was activated through a metaclass override of the install command class in setup.py, executing during the package installation process.\n\nThe campaign employed evolving techniques, with some marked packages in the campaign containing only test code rather than active malicious payloads. This particular package represents a limited-risk infostealer variant focused on basic system enumeration and exfiltration.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • zip-me

Remediation

  • Remove the zip-me package from any systems where it was installed
  • Audit systems that installed zip-me for signs of compromise, including unexpected network connections or data exfiltration
  • Review environment variables and system information that may have been exfiltrated
  • Monitor for similar packages from the 2024-12-langer-updater campaign
  • Use dependency scanning tools to detect and prevent installation of known malicious packages

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-23rq-3mfp-fv93 · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in zip-me (PyPI)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 21, 2026; last updated July 21, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-zip-me-pypi-1v3hv1

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