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containedcritical

Malicious code in @wagni_bot/hyperliquid (npm)

A coordinated campaign of 25 malicious npm packages under the @wagni_bot scope, including @wagni_bot/hyperliquid, deployed credential-stealing malware via postinstall hooks. Published 2026-07-09, the packages exfiltrated SSH keys, cryptocurrency wallets, and .env secrets to a single Telegram bot.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
Any developer who installed @wagni_bot/* packages between 2026-07-09 and removal; credential exposure (SSH keys, wallet files, .env secrets, API keys, seed phrases).
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Affected entities
  • @wagni_bot/hyperliquidTyposquat of Hyperliquid SDK; part of coordinated 25-package campaign under @wagni_bot scope

The npm package @wagni_bot/hyperliquid is a typosquat of the legitimate Hyperliquid SDK, part of a coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 25 malicious packages published under the @wagni_bot scope on 2026-07-09. Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook that executes automatically during npm install, before the package is ever imported by user code.\n\nThe postinstall script performs host and user fingerprinting (hostname, user info, platform), then recursively walks the user's home directory to extract high-value secrets: SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files containing API keys, tokens, and seed phrases. All collected data is JSON-encoded and exfiltrated to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API.\n\nResearch by codelake confirmed the campaign is a single automated actor: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each version (version-lockstep), and all packages exfiltrate to the same Telegram bot token. Error paths are silently swallowed to avoid detection during installation.\n\nThe packages were detected and reported on 2026-07-09 while still live on npm. The attack vector exploits the automatic execution of postinstall hooks before user code runs, making it effective against any developer who ran npm install on any of the 25 packages.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • @wagni_bot/hyperliquid
Domains
  • api.telegram.org

Remediation

  • Immediately uninstall @wagni_bot/* packages and any dependencies that may have installed them
  • Rotate all SSH private keys, cryptocurrency wallet credentials, and API tokens/secrets that may have been exposed
  • Review .env files and environment variables for unauthorized access or exfiltration
  • Audit npm install logs and package-lock.json for presence of @wagni_bot packages
  • Consider the host compromised if @wagni_bot packages were installed; perform full security audit
  • Use npm audit to detect any remaining malicious packages
  • Enable npm package signature verification and consider using private registries with stricter controls

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-35jp-phg5-g2hr · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in @wagni_bot/hyperliquid (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed July 9, 2026; last updated July 28, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-wagni-bot-hyperliquid-npm-1xr3ra

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