Malicious code in @wagni_bot/hyperliquid (npm)

The npm package @wagni_bot/hyperliquid is a typosquat of the legitimate Hyperliquid SDK, part of a coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 25 malicious packages published under the @wagni_bot scope on 2026-07-09. Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook that executes automatically during npm install, before the package is ever imported by user code.\n\nThe postinstall script performs host and user fingerprinting (hostname, user info, platform), then recursively walks the user's home directory to extract high-value secrets: SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files containing API keys, tokens, and seed phrases. All collected data is JSON-encoded and exfiltrated to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API.\n\nResearch by codelake confirmed the campaign is a single automated actor: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each version (version-lockstep), and all packages exfiltrate to the same Telegram bot token. Error paths are silently swallowed to avoid detection during installation.\n\nThe packages were detected and reported on 2026-07-09 while still live on npm. The attack vector exploits the automatic execution of postinstall hooks before user code runs, making it effective against any developer who ran npm install on any of the 25 packages.