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resolvedcritical

Malicious code in dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete (npm)

The npm package dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete contained malicious code that downloads and executes platform-specific native binaries from attacker-controlled hosts at require/import time. The attack uses obfuscation techniques including string-splitting, DNS TXT record reassembly, and filename masquerading to evade detection.

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Disclosed
Last updated
Blast radius
Any npm consumer of dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete; execution occurs at require/import time with installer privileges.
Ecosystems
Attack vectors
Affected entities
  • dolyame-ui-inputautocompletenpm package containing malicious _bootstrap.js

The npm package dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete was found to contain malicious code in its bootstrap.js file. Upon require or import, the code selects a platform-specific binary path and downloads an opaque native executable from author-controlled hosts reconstructed at runtime from string-split arrays: oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, and oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev.\n\nThe package implements multiple anti-analysis techniques. A fallback mechanism reassembles a base64 payload from DNS TXT records enumerated under sdk.dl.wel1.ru. Downloaded binaries are written to obfuscated cache paths (/tmp/.cache on Unix or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_.exe on Windows), marked executable (chmod 0755), and spawned detached via shell commands.\n\nAny process that requires the package immediately executes attacker-controlled native code with the installer's privileges. The string-splitting, diagnostic cache filename masquerading, and DNS-TXT reassembly channel are active anti-analysis techniques rather than legitimate SDK behavior, indicating intentional malicious design.\n\nThe incident was identified and credited to the OpenSSF malicious-packages repository.

Indicators of compromise

Packages
  • dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete
Domains
  • oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev
  • oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev
  • oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev
  • sdk.dl.wel1.ru

Remediation

  • Remove dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete from all projects immediately
  • Audit package.json and lock files for any versions of dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete
  • Review npm audit logs for any installations of this package
  • If the package was installed, assume the system may be compromised; consider full system inspection or reimaging
  • Block the identified attacker-controlled domains at network perimeter
  • Monitor for suspicious outbound connections to the identified domains
  • Use npm security tools to detect and prevent installation of known malicious packages

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-4x76-56pg-4gxg · GitHub Advisory Database

Cite this entry

"Malicious code in dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete (npm)." supplychainattack.org, Supply Chain Attack Incident Catalog. Disclosed August 7, 2026; last updated August 7, 2026. https://supplychainattack.org/incident/malicious-code-in-dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete-npm-1hj2bd

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